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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 15023 
-vs-
WILLIAM ROBERTS CHIPMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), driving or controlling a 
vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt Lake, 
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge, presiding, with a jury, 
and found guilty by the jury of driving or being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower court 
be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was arrested for a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), during the early morning hours of 
October 30, 1975. The facts, as stated in the record, were 
presented as follows: 
During the early morning hours of October 30, 1975, 
Pat Wellbourn was preparing for bed (12:00 or 12:30 a.m.), 
when she "heard a motor pull up" outside her residence on 
Brooklane Drive in Salt Lake County (T.3,4). She looked 
outside her window and saw a pickup truck (camper style) 
driving back and forth, coming close to striking the fire 
hydrant several times (T.5). This was occurring at an 
approximate distance of a little further than thirty to 
thirty-five feet from Ms. Wellbourn' s window through which 
she was viewing the truck (T.4,5). 
The truck eventually came to a stop, and Ms. 
Wellbourn attempted to sleep, but was prevented from so 
doing because the noise of the engine running was "bugging" 
her (T. 6) • She once again looked through the window, seeing 
the globe or dome light on inside the cab of the truck 
(T. 6) • She testified that she saw a person inside the cab 
(a man) (T.6). This person then turned the dome light off 
and then slumped over the steering wheel (T.7). 
-2-
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Ms. Wellbourn concluded her testimony by saying 
that she became quite concerned that the person in the 
truck might have been hurt or sick, so she told Pat 
Quinlen when he arrived at her horne (2:00 or 2:30a.m.), 
at which time the police were called (T.7,8). Larry 
Worley was with Pat Quinlen at that time. Both of them 
left the house to go outside immediately after calling 
the police (T.9). 
On cross-examination, Ms. ~vellbourn testified 
that the engine in the truck was running from the time 
she just noticed the truck (12:00 or 12:30 a.m.), until 
Pat Quinlen and Larry Worley arrived (2:00 or 2:30 a.m.) 
(T.lO,ll). 
Pat Quinlen testified that he arrived at Pat 
Wellbourn's place about 1:00 a.m., at which time he was 
informed of the presence of the truck with a man slumped 
over the steering wheel (T.l3,14). He immediately looked 
through the window and observed the same truck with a man 
slumped over the steering wheel, as had been described 
by Pat Wellbourn (T.l4). The man slumped over the 
steering wheel was identified by Quinlen as the appellant 
(T.l4). 
-3-
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Further testimony by Quinlen revealed that the 
police were notified of this situation, arriving on the 
scene approximately ten minutes thereafter (T.l4,15). 
Quinlen testified that his observations revealed that ilie 
police had a difficult time trying to awaken the appellant, 
and he was still slumped over the steering wheel when the 
police arrived (T.l6). The appellant also had to be helped 
out of the truck by the police (T.l6,17), was "a little bit 
staggery," and presented communication problems to the 
police (T.l7). 
- - ---- --
Upon cross-examination, Quinlen testified to the 
fact that the dome light was on in the truck, the engine 
was running, and the appellant was slumped over the wheel 
when he (Quinlen) first observed the vehicle (T.l9). His 
testimony also revealed that the truck lights were on 
(T.20). 
Larry Worley arrived with Pat Quinlen at Ms. 
Wellbourn's house somewhere between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., 
at which time he noticed the truck parked with the back whe 
on the sidewalk and the front wheels on the street (T.22), 
The truck was one of camper style and was parked in front 
of Ms. Wellbourn's house (T.22). A man, identified by 
Worley as the appellant, was in the truck sitting in the 
driver's seat, slumped over onto his right side (T.23). 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Worley testified that the police had a hard time waking the 
appellant up, and had to "bounce him up and down in the 
seat." (T.24). This process took three to five minutes. 
The appellant was not standing too well (once the officers 
got him out of the truck), was not in a very good mood, 
and was using some "pretty abusive" language, very slurred 
and not very comprehensible. (T. 24,25). Worley testified 
that the appellant had an odor of alcohol on his breath 
(T.25), and that it was his (Worley's) opinion that the 
appellant had been drinking (T.25). Worley concluded his 
testimony on direct examination by saying that the 
appellant had to be assisted by the officers to the 
police car following his arrest because he (appellant) 
"wasn't walking very straight." (T.29). 
On redirect examination, Worley said that in 
his opinion, the appellant was "pretty well sloshed" 
(referring to the state of intoxication) (T.41). Upon 
recross examination, Worley said he observed a cup on 
the dashboard of the truck with alcoholic beverages in it 
(T.42), and was able to smell the odor of alcohol on 
appellant's breath (T.43). 
Officer Shipanboard of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department arrived at Brooklane Drive sometime 
-5-
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after 1:00 a.m. on October 30, 1975. Upon his arrival he 
observed a truck backed up against a fire hydrant with the 
lights on and the engine running (T. 46). There was a man 
slumped over the wheel and a cup in the front window of th1 
truck (T.46). Officer Shipanboard shook the appellant, 
trying to awaken him, but got no response (T. 4 7) • He was 
finally able to arouse the appellant after Officer Neff 
arrived. The appellant was a little fiesty (T.49) and 
smelled like alcohol (T. 50) • He did not walk very stable 
(T.SO), and once at the patrol car, he swung at the 
officers, saying a few unkind remarks (T.Sl). 
Officer Shipanboard testified that in his opinion 
the appellant had been drinking and was at the time under 
the influence of alcohol (T.52). 
On cross-examination, Officer Shipanboard testified 
that alcohol was in the cup found on the dashboard (T.53), 
and that appellant had been drinking it (T.53). He 
reiterated that upon his arrival, he found the truck backed 
up against the hydrant, lights on and engine running (T.SSI 
He also found the appellant slumped over the wheel (T.56). 
Shipanboard stated that he turned the engine off upon his 
arrival, but did not shut off the lights. 
-6-
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The final witness for the prosecution was Officer 
Neff of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department. He 
arrived on the scene after Officer Shipanboard observed 
a man lying down on the front seat of the truck in the 
driver's position with his head towards the passenger 
side (T.63). He noticed an odor of alcohol about the 
appellant (T.64). The lights of the truck (headlights) 
were still on, but the engine had been turned off (T.65). 
The appellant needed assistance from both officers because 
he was unstable on his feet (T.65). Officer Neff testified 
that the appellant was not cooperating in their attempt to 
search him, throwing his arms wildly around at the officers 
(T. 65). 
Subsequent to his being advised of his Miranda 
rights, appellant told Officer Neff that he had been 
drinking earlier that night (T.67,68). 
Officer Neff further testified that he observed 
the cup on the dashboard containing a liquid which had 
the odor of whiskey to it (T.68), and that it was his 
opinion that the appellant was under the influence of 
alcohol (T.68,69). 
Upon cross-examination, Officer Neff testified 
that it took him approximately three to five minut~~o 
awaken the appellant (T.70). 
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On redirect, Neff said that appellant was very 
unstable and unsure of himself on his feet (T.75), and 
his coordination was "off." (T.76). 
Finally, it was Officer Neff's opinion that 
the appellant was "fumbling around" so much due to his 
state of intoxication (T.78). 
The only witness called for the defense was 
Terry Nish, not an eyewitness to the incident, who 
testified as to the difficulty he had had on several 
occasions in awakening the appellant (T.88). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLA.l\:IT' S CONVICTION SHOULD BE AFFIR11ED BECAUSE 
IT RELIES ON ACTS OCCURRING CONCURRENT AND SUBSE-
QUENT TO THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S ARRIVAL AT 
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE. 
A. THE ARRESTING OFFICER MADE A VALID ARREST FOR 
THREE MISDEMEANORS COMMITTED BY APPELLANT IN 
HIS PRESENCE, TO-\HT: ( 1) BEING IN ACTUAL 
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953); (2) BEING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR, 
TO A DEGREE THAT THE PERSON MAY ENDANGER 
HIMSELF OR ANOTHER, IN A PUBLIC PLACE, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701 (1973), 
AS AMENDED; (3) BEING IN AN INTOXICATED 
CONDITION IN A PUBLIC PLACE IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-7-13 (1953), AS AMENDED. 
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B. THE EVIDENCE OF BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL 
CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE M~. § 41-6-44 (1953), 
IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. 
A. Before attempting any response to the points 
of argument set forth by appellant, it should be noted 
that appellant's factual summary and legal arguments have 
been presented based upon a seemingly strong assumption by 
appellant that the facts are as he alleged them to be. The 
jury apparentry viewed the evidence in a different light, 
finding the appellant guilty. Respondent will address 
itself to the facts and legal issues based upon the evidence 
which tends to support the verdict. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has very clearly stated 
that the evidence and any reasonable inferences that fairly 
may be drawn therefrom must be surveyed in the light favorable 
to the jury's verdict. State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 
P.2d 246 (1970). This Court must assume, therefore, that 
the jury believed that evidence which supports its verdict 
and must review the record in that light. Lee v. Howes, 
548 P.2d 619 (Utah 1976). See also State v. Dutchover, 85 
N.M. 72, 509 P.2d 264 (1973), where on appeal from conviction, 
evidence is reviewed in light most favorable to state. 
-9-
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With this in mind, respondent will address the 
issue raised as to whether or not the arrest was valid, 
A look into the Utah Code Annotated and applicable case 
law reveals that a valid arrest was effected. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (1953), as amended, reads 
in part as follows: 
"A peace officer may make an 
arrest • • • without a warrant. . 
(1} For a public offense committed 
or attempted in his presence •. 
It should be noted that the above section does not specify 
that the officer must personally witness the offense for 
which he is making the arrest without a warrant. As the 
section reads, an officer could conceivably watch a 
suspect as he committed or attempted to commit a public 
offense, then arrest him without a warrant and charge him 
with a separate offense which he (the officer) had 
reasonable cause to believe the suspect had committed. 
Such was the case in State v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 4 7, 395 
P.2d 539 (1964). In that case the defendant ran into the 
rear end of a flat-bed truck, killing some passengers in 
the car. The sheriff arrived on the scene within a minute 
or two after the accident. Upon his arrival, the sheriff 
found the defendant sitting on the curb with a strong odor 
of alcohol on his breath and apparently in an intoxicated 
condition. The defendant also stated he was drunk. The 
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defendant was taken to a hospital, treated for wounds, and 
placed under warrantless arrest for operating a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1953). He was also later charged with automobile 
homicide. 
The defendant alleged that his arrest for driving 
while intoxicated, a misdemeanor, was unlawful because it 
was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 
The court rejected this argument, using the rationale that 
"the defendant was intoxicated in a public place in violation 
of Sec. 32-7-13,.U.C.A. 1953." The court concluded its 
attention to this issue by succinctly declaring: 
"Nor can he [defendant] justifiably 
complain because he was arrested for and 
finally charged with a different crime than 
that which the officer had actually seen 
him commit." 395 P.2d at 540. 
Other jurisdictions have similarly rejected arguments 
such as those propounded by the defendant in State v. Bryan, 
supra, holding that warrantless arrests can be made in 
"driving or operating under the influence" cases, where the 
officer does not actually see the offense committed, but has 
reasonable cause to believe that the law has been violated. 
City of Oregon v. Szakovits, 32 Ohio St. 2d 271, 291 N.E.2d 
742 (1972); State v. Darabcsek, 412 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1967); 
-11-
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State v. Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 325 A.2d 353 (1974); 
Commonwealth v. Klock, Pa.Super., 327 A.2d 375 (1974). Seo' 
.I 
also 74 A.L.R. 3d 1138. In both Dickens and Klock, the 
defendant was found by officers in an automobile either on 
the highway or the adjoining shoulder with the engine 
running, the headlights on, and a strong odor of alcohol 
present. In Klock, the defendant admitted that he had beer. 
drinking in a bar earlier and had driven the vehicle. 
The court in Klock, at 327 A.2d 384, seeminglyada1 
a new "dimension" to reasonable cause by declaring that 
police officers could not only use facts obtained through 
personal knowledge to make warrantless arrests, but could': 
"inferences": 
". • • In assessing whether appellant 
was operating the car while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, i.e., 
was committing a crime in their presence, 
the troopers could rely not only on the 
'personal knowledge acquired ••• 
through [their] senses' but also on 
'inferences properly drawn from the 
testimony of their senses." 
Although the case law in Utah is seemingly not as 
broad as that enunciated in some other jurisdictions, 
statutory amendments have broadened the scope of warrantJe; 
arrests by peace officers by enabling them to arrest on 
reasonable cause for believing a person to have committed 
a public offense, although not in the arresting officer's 
-12-
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presence. Certain statutory conditions are also attached 
to this section of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
Section 77-13-3 (3) (a) (b) (c). 
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be seen 
that the arrest was valid based on several theories. 
First, the theory that the officer (Shipanboard) 
observed appellant in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
is sound. The evidence reveals that Officer Shipanboard 
approached the truck in which the appellant was slumped 
over the steering wheel, noticed the engine running and 
headlights on, saw a cup on the dashboard containing what 
appeared to be alcohol, and smelled a strong odor of 
alcohol. This, coupled with the fact that the appellant 
was extremely hard to awaken, being in the early hours 
of the morning, certainly justified Officer Shipanboard 
in arresting appellant for being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953), 
as amended. This is of course looking at the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. The jury was 
also jutified in arriving at such a conclusion, as will 
be discussed later. 
-13-
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The second theory on which the arrest can be justifie: 
as valid is that enunciated in State v. Bryan, supra. 
Officer Shipanboard witnessed the appellant in violation of 
two sections of the Utah Code Annotated, other than Section 
41-6-44. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-13 (1953), reads: 
"No person shall drink liquor 
in a public building, park or 
stadium or be in an intoxicated 
condition in a public place." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (1953), as amended, reads 
in part as follows: 
"(1) A person is guilty of 
intoxication if he is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor • 
to a degree that the person may endanger 
himself or another, in a public place or 
in a private place where he unreasonably 
disturbs other persons." 
Based on the law set forth by this Honorable Court in 
State v. Bryan, supra, Officer Shipanboard could have arrest~ 
appellant for a violation of either or both of the above 
sections, without a warrant, and subsequently charged him wid 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44 (1953). 
Which theory is and was used is not the issue. 
They are both legally sound in this jurisdiction, and au 
both supported by the evidence in the case. The appellant 
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indulged himself in actions which could certainly lead 
Officer Shipanboard to believe that the appellant was 
in a highly intoxicated state, e.g., odor of alcohol 
on breath, slumped over steering wheel in a "passed 
out" condition, slurred speech once awake, unable to 
stand on own feet without assistance, etc. As will 
be subsequently discussed, a jury could also reach 
this same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Based 
upon either theory, the arrest must be upheld as 
valid. 
B. THE EVIDENCE OF BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL 
CONTROL OF A VEHICLE tvHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 
(1953), IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
CONVICTION. 
-15 
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Appellant alleges that the evidence did not support 
the conviction for seemingly three reasons: ( 1) there was no 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the intoxication 
affected the ability of the accused to drive; (2) no breath-
olyzer test was taken by the accused and there was not con-
elusive evidence of driving under the influence; (3) the verdL 
was supported only by circumstantial evidence, and there are 
several possible explanations which support the constitutiona: 
presumption of innocence which are consistent with that evided 
It should just be noted in response that questions 
such as degree of intoxication, impaired ability to drive, 
actual physical control of the vehicle, etc., are questions 
to be determined by the jury, unless as a matter of law evider:
1 
exists on which reasonable men would not differ. State v. 
Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P.2d 911 (1941); State v. Hopkins, 
11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 486 (1961); State v. Schad, supra; 
State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 256 A.2d 231 (1969); ~ 
v. Brown, Or. App., 485 P.2d 444 (1971). 
As is so often the case in appeals, appellant bases 
his argument on evidence which is viewed "through the glasses 
of the appellant." Sometimes these glasses are tinted so as 
to expose and reveal only that version of the evidence which 
tends to support the appellant's allegations. As such, the 
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appellant assumes that the jury is obliged to believe his 
version of the evidence. This Court commented on this 
erroneous assumption in State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d at 487: 
"The difficulty with defendant's 
position is that the rule he relies on 
is not applicable where, as here, there 
is dispute in the evidence and one 
version theory does not support his 
thesis, He errs in assuming that the 
jury was obliged to believe his story 
as to what happened ••. it was their 
exclusive prerogative to judge the 
credit to be given the evidence and to 
determine the facts." 
Appellant seems to be guilty in the case at bar of 
that very situation as described above in Hopkins. He assumes 
that the jury ~believed his interpretation of the evidence, 
therefore giving credence to his explanation as to why the 
appellant was found in the condition he was. This of course, 
is erroneous, and was again commented on by the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Schad, 470 P.2d at 247: 
"As to point (1): Whether the evidence 
justifies the verdict, we survey the evidence 
and any reasonable inferences that fairly 
may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable 
to the jury's verdict. However, there are 
some further observations as to the manner 
in which the basic rule is applicable in 
this case. It is true, as the defendant 
contends, that where a conviction is based 
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should 
be looked upon \vith caution, and that it must 
exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the 
guilt of defendant. This is entirely logical, 
because if the jury believes that there is a 
reasonable hypothesis in the evidence consis-
tent with the defendant's innocence, there 
would naturally be a reasonable doubt as to 
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his guilt. Nevertheless, that pre-
position does not apply to each circum-
stance separately, but is a matter within 
the prerogative of the jury to determine 
from all of the facts and circumstances 
shown; and if therefrom they are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's 
guilt, it necessarily follows that they 
regarded the evidence as excluding every 
other reasonable hypothesis. Unless upon 
our review of the evidence, and the reason-
able inferences fairly to be deduced 
therefrom, it appears that there is no 
reasonable basis for such a conclusion, we 
should not overturn the verdict." 
Appellant has not really offered his version of t~ [ 
evidence, but has merely alleged that there are possible 
explanations which tend towards the innocence of appellant. 
,1\ review of the evidence shows that the jury could very well 
have found that the evidence presented, and inferences fairly I 
drawn therefrom, excluded every reasonable hypothesis except 
the guilt of the appellant. 
The evidence shows three witnesses observing a man 
slumped over the steering wheel of a truck in the early hours 
of the morning. The headlights of the truck are on and the 
engine is running. One of the witnesses observes the truck 
moving forward and backward in continuous motion, striking a 
nearby fire hydrant. The police are called and subsequentlY 
arrive. Officer Shipanboard finds the appellant slumped over I 
the steering wheel, a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, 
and a cup of whisky sitting on the dashboard. He too finds the 
engine running and headlights on. The officer finds it 
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extremely hard to awaken the appellant. Officer Neff then 
arrives, and observes the same situation, with the exception 
of the engine being shut off. The appellant is unable to 
stand on his feet without assistance, and becomes very fisty 
and uncooperative with the officer. His speech is quite 
slurred and he fumbles about incoherently, at times taking 
a swing at the officers. He admits having been drinking earlier 
in the evening. 
Certainly the above set of facts have to be stretched 
to the point of exaggeration to support a theory that the 
appellant was "sleeping," and that someone else had driven the 
truck there for him. Eyewitness testimony by Pat Hellbourn 
disputes this theory, as the jury could reasonably believe that 
she saw the appellant drive the truck to the position in which 
it was found by the officers. Certainly a theory that the 
appellant was "passed out" or was "sleeping it off" is plausible 
and could have been so believed by the jury, as well as appel-
lant's contention that the appellant "happened to sleeping" at 
that time of the morning. They jury could have found that the 
action of appellant in leaning over the steering wheel with 
the motor running and the headlights on constituted "actual 
physical control" as specified in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44, 
(1953) as amended. 
Nevertheless, an inescapable conclusion is apparent: 
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that the evidence presented, and the inferences to be fa~~ 
draHn therefrom, was sufficient to support the verdict. 
Appellant questions the validity of the circumstan-
tial evidence, and seems to allege that no conviction can 
stand because there was no chemical or breatholyzer tests 
administered. Officer Neff testified that no field sobr~~ 
tests were administered because of the fact that it Has the 
opinion of the officers that the appellant was in no condition 
to perform any of these tests (T.75). 
Even so, Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 ~1953) does not 
require that any tests be administered, but may be used to 
establish certain presumptions. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (b) (4) 
(1953) states: 
"The foregoing provisions of this 
subdivision shall not be construed as J 
limiting the introduction of any other 
competent evidence bearing upon the 
question whether or not the person was 
under the influence of alcohol." 
The officers were not required by law to administer any of 
the tests enumerated in §41-6-44. Thus, the verdict should no: 
be affected by this fact alone. See People v. Culp, 537 P.M 
746 (Colo. 1975), where the court said that chemical tests are 
neither necessary nor required to prove intoxication. 
As to the question of circumstantial evidence, it is 
a well settled principle of law that no distinction between 
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence is recognized as 
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far as probative force is concerned. State v. Englehart, 
supra. At 256 A.2d 232, the Court in Englehart said: 
" ... if evidence, whether direct or 
circumstantial, should convince a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused 
is guilty, that is all that is required 
for conviction." 
This s~ue principle holds true in Utah, as recently expressed 
in State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
Turning now to the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to sustain a finding by the jury that the appellant 
was in actual physical control of the vehicle and also under 
the influence of intoxicating liquors, it must again be noted 
that these are questions for the jury to determine. There are 
however, many cases, some with nearly identical factual 
situations such as the one at hand, which have dealt with these 
issues. 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with our own 
jurisdiction. The most notable case, also cited by appellant, 
is that of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 4C4, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). 
There, the defendant was convicted of being in actual physical 
control of his vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. He was found asleep in his car with the smell of alcohol 
about him. His car was completely off the traveled portion of 
the highway and the motor was not running. His conviction was 
reversed on appeal. The Court seemed to strongly imply that 
the difference between the Bugger case and similiar cases of 
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other jurisdictions was the fact that the car was not on t~ 
traveled portion of the highway, the engine was not runni~, 
etc. The issue of whether or not one is found behind the 
steering wheel or in the car with the motor running seems to 
be of significance in determining \vhether or not there is act
11
. 
physical control, not only in Utah but in other jurisdictions, 
Jenkins v. State, Okl. Cr., 501 P.2d 905 (1972), where defen· 
dant was found in an automobile, which was in a ditch with the 
lights on and motor running, and was convicted; State v. ~/ebb, I 
78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), where defendant was held to I 
be in actual physical control when he was found "passed out" 
sitting behind the steering wheel with the motor running; 
Jacobsen v. State, 551 P.2d 935 (Alaska 1976), where 
was found sleeping in the front seat, just under the 
wheel, and motor running. See also 47 A.L.R. 2d 571 
cases. 
defendant I 
steering I 
for other I 
The term "actual physical control" has been d•ofined 
by this Court in State v. Bugger, 483 P.2d at 443: 
"The word 'actual' has been defined 
as meaning 'existing in act or reality; 
••• in action or existence at the time 
being; present; ••. ' The word 'physical' 
is defined as 'to exercise restraining 
or directing influence over; to dominate; 
regulate; hence, to hold from actions; to 
curb.' The term in 'actual physical 
control' in its ordinary sense means 
'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, 
directing influence, domination or 
regulation.'" 
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Many of these terms and expressions were used in State v. 
~~ 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1952); Parker v. State, 
Okl. Cr., 424 P.2d 997 (1967) and Hughes v. State, Okl. Cr. 
535 P.2d 1023 (1975), in defining "actual physical control." 
It should be noted that the Court in Parker adopted the 
definition set forth in Ruona, and the Utah Supreme Court in 
Bugger quoted from Ruona in defining "actual physical control." 
In Ruona, the defendant was found in his parked automobile while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, with the motor 
still running. 
Was there evidence to adequately find that the appel·lant 
in the case at -bar \vas ir. actual physical control of his 
vehicle? Based upon the overwhelming majority of case law, 
the answer is yes. The appellant, while behind the steering 
wheel, with the motor running, was in a position in which he 
could exercise total management and authority over the move-
ment of the vehicle. He could make the automobile move by 
merely shifting the gear. As was pointed out in Ruona, control 
means more than the ability to stop an automobile, it means 
the ability to keep it from moving or starting, and to exercise 
directing influence over. The jury could reasonably find that 
the appellant did in fact exercise "actual physical control" 
over the truck in the case at bar. 
Finally, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the jury finding that the appellant was 
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under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Here again, this 
is a question of jury determination. Lombard v. Cory, 95 
Idaho 868, 522 P.2d 531 (1974). There are however, cases whkt 
have established certain definitions and guidelines. 
Different jurisdictions seem to have different word· 
ings or phrases defining the term "under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor", yet they all basically say the same thinJI 
i.e., keep the person who is under the influence of alcohol ofi
1
1 
the public highways in the capacity as a driver. Most jurisdic·f 
tions have held that no specific degree of intoxication is ( 
required, only that the driver at the time he was charged had I 
consumed intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to influence I 
or affect his driving of a motor vehicle. State v. r1cFarland, 
I 
401 P.2d 824 (Idaho 1965); State v. Warner, 97 Idaho 204, 541 
P.2d 977 (1975). Colorado has adopted as its test for the 
level of intoxication one of "substantial ( . . . > I 1ntox1cat1on so as 
to render the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle 
Thompson v. People, 510 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1973). Oklahoma has 
consistently held that a person is "operating a motor vehicle 1 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor·• if n1s ne~vo 
. - - \ 
system, brain or muscles are impaired to any appreciable degree 
so that he cannot operate his automobile as would an ordinary,! 
. s 
prudent and cautious man, in full possession of his facultl6,' 
using reasonable care, under tight conditions. Leullen ~ 
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~, 64 Okl. Cr. 382, 81 P.2d 323 (1938); Application of 
Baggett, 531 P~2d lOll (Okl. 1974); Appeal of Tucker, Okla. 
App. 538 P.2d 626 (1975). The New Mexico Supreme Court, in 
State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280 (1975) held that 
"under the influence" meant a person who is to the slightest 
degree less able, either mentally or physically, or both, to 
exercise clear judgement and steady hand necessary to handle 
an automobile with safety to himself and the public. Finally, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Robinson, 385 P.2d 754 
(Oregon 1963), had adopted the test of whether one has imbibed 
to the extent that his mental and physical condition is 
deleteriously affected. See also 142 A.L.R., 550, 555. 
Perhaps the best summation of all the definitions 
was expressed in Grooms v. State, 142 P.2d 862 (Okl. 1943), 
where the court, at 864 said: 
" ••• It is not a question of how 
much intoxicating liquor a person accused 
of operating his car while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor has drunk, 
but rather a question of whether or not he 
has imbibed enough alcoholic drink to affect 
his faculties to such an extent that the 
jury, under all the facts in the case, 
could reasonably conclude that he was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor." 
It matters not which definition is applied, the fact 
remains that the appellant's condition could very comfortably 
fit into any of the tests adopted. The jury could easily find 
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that appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
at the time he was discovered by Officer Shipanboard, not 
only because of the condition he (appellant) was in at that 
time, but also because of his actions upon and after being , 
awakened. The jury could also draw reasonable inferences from I 
the presence of the cup containing the alcohol on the dashboarcl 
The evidence as presented, and the inference to be 
fairly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to sustain the jury's 
verdict. 
POINT II 
THE CONVICTIOc\1 IN '::'HE LOWER COURT MUST BE 
AFFIRMED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE 
JURY MAY HAVE BASED ITS FINDING ON THE CONDUCT 
OF THE APPELLANT INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE ON HIS 
CONDITION AFTER THE POLICE OFFICERS ARRIVED. 
A. APPELL.Z\.NT HAD ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL 
OF THE VEHICLE WHEN THE OFFICERS ARRIVED. 
B. THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS 
CONVICTED IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS 
APPLIED TO APPELh~NT, NOR IS IT CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
C. APPELLANT'S "SLEEPING" CONDITION IS A 
FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY, 
I.E., ~'lAS THE APPELLANT TRULY SLEEPING 
IN THE USUAL CONNOTATION OF THE WORD, 
OR WAS HE "PASSED OUT" DUE TO INTOXICATION. 
A. APPELLANT HAD ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL 
OF THE VEHICLE WHEH THE OFFICERS ARRIVED. 
Appellant contends that he did not drive or have 
actual physical control of the vehicle subsequent to the 
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the arrival of the officers. This issue was thoroughly 
reviewed in section B under Point I of this brief. However, 
as a su~ation of that discussion, it can be said that 
whether or not the appellant had actual physical control of 
the vehicle at the time of the arrival of the officer or 
subsequent thereto is a matter wholly within the prerogative 
of the jury, to be decided based upon the evidence presented 
and any inferences derived therefrom. This issue was apparently 
decided by the jury contra to appellant's point of vie\'{. 
B. THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH APPELLANT WAS 
CONVICTED IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT, NOR IS IT CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Appellant now alleges that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 
(1953) is vague as applied to him, since all reasonable men 
would have to guess that its meaning included a sleeping person. 
It should first of all be noted that statutes very 
similiar to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953) as amended have 
been upheld in most jurisdictions as not being vague or uncertain, 
therefore, constitutional. State v. Ruona, supra~ Thompson v. 
People, supra. 
The standard as to statutory certainty in Utah is 
expressed in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 
(1969): 
".- •• The well-established rule 
is that a statute creating a crime 
should be sufficiently certain that 
persons of ordinary intelligence who 
-27-
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desire to obey the law may know how 
to conduct themselves in conformity 
with it. A fair and logical con-
comitant of that rule is that such 
a penal statute should be similarly 
clear, specific and understandable 
as to the penalty imposed for its 
violation." 453 P.2d at 148. 
With this in mind, one must look now to the intent of the 
legislative in enacting §41-6-44, and then to the specific 
language used. 
In enacting Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953), it 
seems very clear that the legislative intended to define a~ 
enact two separate offenses; one being: "it is unlawful. .. for 
any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to drive ... any vehicle within the state;" and the other being: 
"it is unlawful ... for any person who is under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor ... to be in actual physical control of a~ 
vehicle within the state." ("under the influence of intox~~ 
ing liquor" was later changed to "under the influence of alcono: 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, in ~ 
v. State, supra., at p.lOOO, held that the legislatllre, in 
. I 
::·::::g C::: i:n:~u:: 1 ::~: :n: 1::: ~: t :: t::::: :: :::::: ::''"' I 
offenses. Respondent contends that the Utah legislature had 
the same thought process in mind when enacting Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44 (1953). 
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The purpose in wording Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 
(1953) to include both those who drive under the influence 
and those who are in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence is two fold: (1) in the case of 
one driving under the influence, to get off the highways 
those people whose judgment, vision, reflexes and ability to 
see and react have been impaired by drink, State v. Montieth, 
417 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Oregon 1966); (2) in the case of one who 
is in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence, to enable the police to apprehend the drunken 
driver before he strikes, Hughes v. State, supra. 
In summary then, the Utah legislature intended to 
make it a crime for one to be under the influence of alcohol 
while in actual physical control of a vehicle. In ascertain-
ing whether one is in "actual physical control" or not, the 
general rule that "words of a statute are to be interpreted 
in their ordinary, everyday sense, unless a contrary inter-
pretation is indicated in the statute" should be applied. State 
v. Ruona, 321 P.2d at 618. Using State v. Bugger, supra, as a 
guideline, one must use powers beyond human comprehension to 
find vagueness or ambiguity in the phrase "actual physical 
control" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953). See 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-1-106 (1973) as amended and Luethen v. 
~, supra., for rules of construction of drunk driving 
statute (to be given literal construction so as to bring 
safety to those who drive the public highways). 
Appellant argues that no union or joint operat~n 
of act and intent exist as required by Utah Code Ann. §76-l-lj 
(1953}. Utah Code Ann. §76-l-21 (1953) specifies that intent 
is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense 
and sound mind and discretion of the accused. Utah Code AM. 
§76-1-22 (1953) states to the effect that intoxication is 
relating to act and intent. A jury could find that appellant 
had the necessary intent to have actual physical control of thi 
vehicle by being in the vehicle in an intoxicated condition, 
behind the steering wheel, with the engine running. If the 
jury believed the testimony of Pat Wellbourn, they could find I 
that the appellant had the intent to operate or drive the vehicl 
by looking at the very act of driving by the appellant. I 
As for the act itself, sufficient evidence existed 1 
whereby the jury could find that the appellant did drive or 
actually control physically the vehicle in which he was found. 
In conclusion, no evidence or argument has been 
presented to show that Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953) wasor 
is void for vagueness as applied to appellant. Sufficient 
evidence does exist by which the jury could find the necessarj 
elements of the offense charged on which to convict. 
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C. APPELLANT'S "SLEEPING" CONDITION IS 
A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY, 
I.E., WAS THE APPELLANT TRULY SLEEPING 
IN THE USUAL CONNOTATION OF THE WORD, 
OR lvAS HE "PASSED OUT" DUE TO 
INTOXICATION. 
Appellant alleges that it appears that the legislature 
has made sleeping a crime, and that under Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44 (1953), all reasonable men would have to guess that 
its meaning included a person sleeping. Appellant seems, 
however, to ignm:e the key question to the word "sleeping," 
that being, "Why was the appellant sleeping?" Was he, as 
the old saying goes, "Takine a snooze" or was he so drunk 
from imbibing in alcohol that he eventually "passed out" and 
had to "sleep it off." 
As mentioned before, these are questions for the jury 
to determine from the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
issue, and as pointed out in earlier discussion, the evidence 
and reasonable inference was presented by which the jury could 
adequately decide this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has alleged several points of error, which 
respondent feels have no legal merit. No showing of pre-
judical error has been made. All presumptions form the 
validity of the jury verdict below. Simpson v. General Motors 
~., 24 utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970). The parties have 
had a fair opportunity to present their evidence and have the 
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issues determined by a jury, and as this Court said in 1 ~ 
Howes, 548 P.2d at 621: 
" ... when that has been accomplished 
we will not disturb the determination 
made by the jury and the trial court 
unless it is shown that there was sub-
stantial and prejudicial error which 
prevented a fair trial, or that there 
is no substantial basis in the evidence 
which reasonable minds could conclude 
as the jury did ... " 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons heretofore stated, the conviction 
should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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